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INTERPRETING "OWNER" AND "OPERATOR"
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA: EDWARD HINES
LUMBER COMPANY V. VULCAN
MATERIALS COMPANY, 861 F.2D
155 (7TH CIR. 1988)
The inadequacy of methods for the treatment and disposal of haz-
ardous waste has become an issue of national concern.' In response,
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2 CERCLA imposes
1. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before ihe Subcommittees
on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Committee on Environment
and Public Works (Part 1), 96th Cong., Ist Session 82-83 (1979) (statement of Thomas
C. Jorling, Ass't. Admin., Water and Hazardous Materials, EPA). See also Rich, Per-
sonal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107,
13 B.C. ENV'T An'. L. REv. 643, 645-46 (1986) (the large number of inactive hazard-
ous waste sites is a serious threat to the environment and public health). See infra note
2 for disbussion of CERCLA's legislative history. Thomas C. Jorling, testified in 1979:
Most of the solid wastes, and in particular hazardous waste, produced in the
United States in the past have been disposed of using environmentally unsound
methods. Given a relative surplus of land, an economic system which failed to
incorporate environmental damages into product costs, and ignorance of what was
occurring underground at disposal sites, past disposal practices have created a
large number of situations in which the environment and public health are
threatened.
Id. See generally Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CER-
CLA, I1 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1986) (the inadequate disposal of hazardous waste
is a problem of epic proportions).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Prior to CERCLA, Congress
passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. 111986). RCRA focused on the management and regula-
tion of hazardous waste disposal. RCRA, otherwise referred to as "cradle-to-grave"
legislation, authorized the regulation of hazardous waste from the time of its creation to
the time of its disposal. But RCRA did not address the problem of abandoned hazard-
ous waste sites. RCRA's omission prompted Congress to complete the regulatory
scheme with CERCLA. H. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119-6125. See Rich, supra note 1, at 646-649
(discussing RCRA's provisions and deficiencies). See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil
Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985) ("Deficiencies in RCRA have left regula-
tory gaps."); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ("It was the
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liability upon "owners" and "operators" of facilities which must dis-
pose of hazardous waste.' In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA with
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) to pro-
vide the government with a right to contribution from liable parties.4
precise inadequacies resulting from RCRA's lack of applicability to inactive and aban-
doned hazardous waste disposal sites that prompted the passage of CERCLA."); United
States v. A&F Materials Company, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. Ill. 1984)
("CERCLA was enacted because Congress realized there were serious gaps in
RCRA."); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) ("CERCLA
was promulgated in response to deficiencies in RCRA."); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 n.2 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Both the House and the
Senate Committee Reports express the need for prompt action, concern over inadequa-
cies of existing legislation, and detail the magnitude of the problems caused by hazard-
ous waste disposal in this country.").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Congress assigned to persons listed in section 107(a) the liability
for all costs incurred in cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Congress enacted this liabil-
ity scheme to ensure "that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or
injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their action." S. REP. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). See also State of Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing the legislative history to § 107(a) and
concluding that Congress intended for those who create hazardous waste to bear the
cleanup costs).
4. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613, 1647 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). See Colorado
v. A.S.A.R.C.O., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985) (explaining that this provi-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/9
EDWARD HINES LUMBER V. VULCAN MATERIALS
While several federal district courts have attempted to define the de-
gree of involvement necessary to hold a person liable as an "operator"
under CERCLA,5 only two federal appellate courts have squarely ad-
dressed the issue.6 In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
sion codifies the federal common law principle, recognized by courts in the context of
CERCLA, that contribution can be obtained only from parties liable under the gov-
erning law).
5. See, eg., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (hold-
ing a parent corporation that merged with its wholly owned subsidiary and assumed all
the subsidiary's obligations under California law liable for response costs resulting from
the release or threatened release of hazardous substance from toxic waste disposal site);
United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (hold-
ing a corporate officer who arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste personally
liable under CERCLA); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D.
Ark. 1987) (holding a chemical company which owned and operated the chemical lia-
ble for the removal of toxic waste); Sunnen Pro. Co. v. Chemteeh Ind., Inc., 658 F.
Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding a chemical company which once produced and
disposed of hazardous wastes liable under CERCLA § 107(a)(2) to transferee of prop-
erty for necessary response costs incurred in decontamination efforts); United States v.
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding plant supervisor and chief executive
officer who had ultimate authority for decisions regarding disposal liable for clean up
costs under § 107(a)(3)); Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (hold-
ing that a parent corporation may not invoke the "corporate veil" to protect itself
against its subsidiary's CERCLA liability when the parent owned and operated the sub-
sidiary's facilities).
See also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (holding a bank which held a mortgage on land and then purchased it at a
foreclosure sale liable for the cost of hazardous waste cleanup.); In re T.P. Long Chem.
Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that the trustee of a bankruptcy
estate which includes a hazardous waste producer is the "operator" of that facility liable
under § 9607(a)(1) for CERCLA response costs); United States v. Mirabile, 23 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1511 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding a shareholder who personally managed
a facility owned by his corporation personally liable as an "owner" or "operator" under
CERCLA); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal Co., 653 F. Supp.
984 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding parties to a joint venture liable as "operators" under CER-
CLA); United States v. Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1026 (D.N.H. 1984) (hold-
ing that persons who arranged for disposal or transport of hazardous substances need
not own or possess waste to be liable under CERCLA).
6. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding a corpo-
rate officer who managed a facility personally liable under CERCLA) (see infra notes
33-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shore Realty); United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding a corporate officer with authority to handle and dispose of hazardous waste
liable under § 107(a)(3)) (see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for discussion of
NEPACCO). See also United States v. Dart Ind., Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding a state environmental agency not liable as an "owner" or "operator" of haz-
ardous waste site under CERCLA because the agency did not manage or participate in
the activities that contributed to the release of hazardous wastes); Joslyn Manufacturing
Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (following Hines' approach).
1990]
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Co.,' the Seventh Circuit held a chemical supplier to a lumber plant
not liable for cleanup costs because it was not an "owner" or
"operator."'
Edward Hines Lumber Co., a wood preserving company, contracted
with Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc. to build a processing plant in
Mena, Arkansas.9 Pursuant to the agreement, Osmose designed and
constructed the facility and installed the wood treatment system. Os-
mose also trained the personnel and supplied the hazardous chemicals
for the system. 'o Osmose licensed Hines to use its trademark, and re-
served a right to inspect ongoing operations.11 Hines, however, oper-
ated the plant. 2 After two years of operation Hines sold the plant to
the current owner, Mid-South Wood Products, Inc. 3 The Environ-
mental Protection Agency"g (EPA) subsequently declared the site con-
taminated by toxic substances' 5 and ordered Hines and Mid-South to
7. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit has followed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision and did not extend CERCLA liability to a parent corporation whose
wholly owned subsidiaries were offenders. Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T. L. James &
Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
8. 861 F.2d at 158-59.
9. Id. at 156. Hines had no experience with using chromated copper arsenate
(CCA) to preserve wood, but Osmose represented to Hines that it could handle both the
CCA treatment process and the marketing of the treated product. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 7, Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1988) (No. 85-1142).
10. 861 F.2d at 156. Hines paid Osmose $135,840 and promised to purchase all of
its requirements of chromated copper arsenate from Osmose for the next five years. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id at 156. As an operator of the facility, Hines controlled daily operations,
hired employees, decided how much wood to produce, where to sell it, and at what
price. Id. at 158.
13. Id at 156. As a result of the sale, Hines assigned its interest in the agreement to
Mid-South. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988) (No. 85-1142).
14. "Although the Act grants most of the substantial authority to the President, he
has delegated these and other superfund implementation authority to the EPA, the
Coast Guard, and various other agencies." United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.14 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing Exec. Order
No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981)).
15. 861 F.2d at 155. The EPA investigated the CCA plant in November 1985. The
investigation consisted of collecting and analyzing surface and subsurface soils and
groundwater immediately adjacent to the plant. The EPA found the largest amount of
arsenic-contaminated soil within a 200-foot radius of the plant. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 13, Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1988) (No. 85-1142).
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remove the offending chemicals.1 6 Hines filed suit in the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois to recover decontamination costs
from its various chemical suppliers.17 The district court granted the
suppliers' summary judgment motion, holding Osmose not liable as an
"operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability because it did not con-.
trol or manage the Mena facility. 8 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, holding Osmose not liable as an "owner" or "operator" under
CERCLA.1 9
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to: (1) facilitate the prompt
cleanup of hazardous dumpsites by providing financing for both gov-
ernmental and private responses, and (2) place the ultimate financial
burden upon those responsible for the waste.2" CERCLA created the
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, commonly known as
"Superfund," to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.2 ' Sec-
tion 104 of CERCLA permits the EPA to use Superfund moneys to
clean up the hazardous waste sites and to recover costs from responsi-
ble parties pursuant to section 107.22
16. 861 F.2d at 155. CERCLA authorizes the EPA to respond or compel response
to actual or threatened releases of hazardous materials. Belthoff, supra note 1, at 144.
17. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.
1988). Hines initially filed a cause of action against his suppliers based on state tort law.
The district court found the three year statute of limitations expired and dismissed
Hine's claims. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 669 F. Supp. 854
(N.D. M. 1987).
18. 685 F. Supp. at 657.
19. 861 F.2d 155, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1988).
20. Rich, supra note 1, at 671. The 96th Congress hastily passed CERCLA during
its closing days. Consequently, CERCLA's legislative history is very scant. Nonethe-
less, the congressional members who favored CERCLA viewed it as speedy resolution
to the major problems associated with hazardous waste. CERCLA proponents feared
that waiting to pass similar legislation until the next Congressional session would only
result in a weaker version of CERCLA. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 34 (1982). See also Belthof, supra note 1, at 144 (by hastily
drafting CERCLA, Congress created many uncertainties in the statute).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. IV 1986). Congress imposed a tax on oil and chemical
producers to finance Superfund. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. IV 1986). CERCLA
§ 221 authorized Congress to appropriate $44 million per year from 1981 to 1985 to
Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982). CERCLA § 207(o) authorized Congress to
appropriate $212.5 million to the fund from 1987 to 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. IV
1986). See generally Rich, supra note 1, at 650-51 (discussing CERCLA's regulatory
tools for protecting the public from hazardous waste).
22. Rich, supra note 1, at 651. Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA provides:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat
1990]
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Section 107 of CERCLA establishes "owners" and "operators" as
one group of potentially responsible parties.23 However, the statutory
definition of "owner" and "operator" is circular.24 Neither CERCLA
nor its legislative history clearly identifies when one is liable as an
"owner" or "operator. '25 Consequently, courts interpret the Congres-
sional intent26 and the statutory language2 7 to impose liability28 upon
of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat
of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminate which may present
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or ar-
range for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazard-
ous substance, pollutant or contaminate... or take any other response measure
consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary
to protect the public health or welfare or the environment...
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. See supra note 3 for text of CERCLA's potentially responsible parties.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) defines owner or operator as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control
of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
forehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.
1988).
26. See generally Grad, supra note 20, at I (discussing the problems congressional
leaders tried to solve with CERCLA). See also Rich, supra note I, at 650 (Congress
intended to respond to problems posed by hazardous waste sites and finance the
cleanup).
27. CERCLA's language did not resolve issues of liability. Rather, Congress in-
tended for traditional and evolving principles of common law to govern issues of liabil-
ity under CERCLA. State of Colorado v. Asarco, 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo.
1985). See also United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (S.D. Okla.
1983) (holding that CERCLA mandates development of a uniform federal common law
rather than reference to the common law of each state).
28. Courts base liability upon the parties' relationship to the contaminated site or to
the hazardous substances themselves, regardless of fault. See Garber, Federal Common
Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365,
367-68 (1987). Further, Congress intentionally omitted a standard of liability under
CERCLA. Courts addressing the issue have followed one of two positions: (I) the
Restatement which allows joint and several liability whenever the harm is indivisible; or(2) the Gore Amendment which allows a court to impose either joint and several liabil-
ity or apportionment according to a number of different factors including: (1) the abil-
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persons who (1) control and manage the facility,2 9 (2) discover the con-
tamination and have authority to implement abatement measures,30 or
(3) are joint venturers in the enterprise which causes the
contamination. 
3 1
Only two circuit courts have thoroughly examined liability as an
"operator" under CERCLA.32 In New York v. Shore Realty Com-
pany,3 3 the Second Circuit held Shore Realty's only shareholder and
officer personally liable for the State's response costs under CERCLA
section 107(a)(1).34 The court emphasized that CERCLA's definition
of "owner" or "operator" excludes a person who, without participating
in the management of a facility, "holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the facility."3 The court held that
this exception implies that an owner who manages a facility is person-
ally liable under CERCLA.36 Furthermore, the court held that the
ity of parties to distinguish their relative contribution to the release; (2) the amount of
waste involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of wastes involved; (4) the degree of involve-
ment of the parties in disposal decisions; (5) the degree of care exercised by the parties;
and (6) the degree to which the parties cooperated with the government in prevention of
the harm. The Senate, unlike the House of Representatives, did not pass the Gore
Amendment. See generally Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1458, 1496 (1986) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the
different standards of liability); Moore & Kowalski, When Is One Generator Liable For
Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 93 (1984-85) (discussing joint and several lia-
bility under CERCLA).
29. See infra notes 33-38, 47-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of State of
New York v. Shore Realty, Inc., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Caro-
lawn, 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984); Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
30. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
3 1. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v.
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986).
32. See cases cited supra note 6. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the federal appellate decisions.
33. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
34. Id. at 1053. In Shore Realty, the State of New York sued the corporation and
Donald LeoGrande, its officer and stockholder for cleanup costs. Id. at 1037. Le-
oGrande controlled and directed all corporate decisions. Id. at 1038. At the time Shore
Realty acquired the property in question, LeoGrande knew about the storage of more
than 700,000 gallons of hazardous waste on the premises. Nevertheless, the corporation
acquired the site from the state to develop land. Id. at 1037. The court held the corpo-
ration liable in addition to LeoGrande. Id. at 1042.
35. Id. at 1052. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) excludes owners
who merely own security interests without participating in management.
36. 759 F.2d at 1052.
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shareholder was an "operator" of the facility because he was in charge
of its daily operations.37 Thus, the court expanded the definition of
"owner" and "operator" by imposing individual liability upon persons
who are involved in corporate misconduct.38
In 1986, the Eighth Circuit followed the Second Circuit's lead and
broadened the scope of "owner" or "operator" liability further. 39 In
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.' °
(NEPACCO), the court affirmed a district court decision that held a
corporate officer who arranged for the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances personally liable under section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA.41 The
37. Id.
38. Id. CERCLA defines "person" to mean "an individual, firm, corporation, asso-
ciation, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Gov-
ernment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Courts have imposed
personal liability on corporate officers and owners who incur CERCLA liability while
acting within the scope of their employment. United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical and Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Carolawn,
21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). See infra notes 40-45, 48-52, and ac-
companying text for a discussion of these cases. See also Escude Cruz v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Co., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding corporate officer of an
employer corporation liable when the officer "directs or participates actively in the com-
mission of a tortious act"); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp.
162 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding corporation president who stored, treated, and disposed
of numerous varieties of chemical wastes in six soil basins personally liable); United
States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding president and principal
shareholder of a small chemical firm personally liable under CERCLA as a "person"
who arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste).
39. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co. (NEPACCO),
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); see Comment, Officer and Shareholder Liability Under
CERCLA: United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Ca Inc, 34
WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 461 (1988) (questioning the NEPACCO decision to
expand CERCLA liability). But see United States v. Dart Industries, Inc. 847 F.2d 144
(8th Cir. 1988) (state environmental agency was not "owner" or "operator" of hazard-
ous waste site under CERCLA, because it did not manage or participate in any activi-
ties that contributed to release of hazardous wastes).
40. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
41. In NEPACCO, the United States government sued Michaels, its president, and
Lee, its vice president, both of whom arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste. The
government also sued Mills, the transporter of the hazardous substances, and Syntax
Agribusiness, the owner and lessor of the plant, to recover response costs under CER-
CLA. Michaels and Lee knew that NEPACCO's manufacturing process produced vari-
ous toxic byproducts which were pumped into a holding tank and emptied by waste
haulers. Subsequently, NEPACCO, with the approval of Lee, entered into an agree-
ment with Mills to store the drums at Denney farm. Eight years later, the EPA learned
about the hazardous waste disposal at the Denney farm, and ordered a cleanup of the
site. The EPA sued to recover response costs and the court held the defendants liable
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District Court for the Western District of Missouri defined "owners"
and "operators" as persons who maintain: (1) the capacity to discover
discharges in a timely fashion; (2) the power to manage others in con-
trol of mechanisms that cause pollution; and (3) the authority to pre-
vent and abate damage.42
The district court reasoned that imposing liability upon only the cor-
poration, and not upon the individuals responsible for decisions about
handling and disposing hazardous substances, would frustrate the stat-
utory scheme.43 Thus, the court concluded that ownership or actual
possession of those substances by the officer was not necessary for lia-
bility." Rather, a corporate officer's authority to control the handling
and disposal of the hazardous substances warranted personal liability
as an "operator."
4 5
Although only a few federal appellate courts46 have addressed
"owner" or "operator" liability under CERCLA, several other federal
district courts have formulated definitions to impose liability.47 In
United States v. Carolawn,4 s the District Court for the District of
South Carolina held that a corporate officer responsible for the day-to-
day operations of hazardous waste disposal is an "operator" for pur-
under CERCLA under § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 1907 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
The district court found Mills liable as a transporter of hazardous substances. Id. at
846-47. The district court held Lee liable as an owner or operator and also as a person
who by contract, arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal of hazardous
substances. Id. at 847-49. The district court also held Michaels liable as a person who
arranged for the transport and disposal of hazardous substances. Iad at 849-50.
42. 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972)).
43. 810 F.2d at 743. See supra note 38 and accompanying text discussing individual
liability under CERCLA.
44. 579 F. Supp. at 849. See also United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H.
1984) (person who arranges for transportation or disposal of hazardous waste need not
own or possess the hazardous waste to be liable).
45. 579 F. Supp. at 847. The court imposed personal liability upon Lee under CER-
CLA § 107(a)(3) because he arranged for the transportation and disposal of hazardous
substances and thus actually participated in NEPACCO's CERCLA violations, even
though Lee did the work on behalf of NEPACCO. Id
46. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
appellate decisions.
47. See cases cited supra note 5. See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text dis-
cussing federal district court cases which have examined liability as an "operator"
under CERCLA.
48. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984).
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poses of CERCLA liability.49 In making its determination, the court
adopted the test used by the NEPACCO district court.5" Furthermore,
the Carolawn court noted that the CERCLA definition of "owner" and
"operator" contemplated personal liability of corporate officials who
maintained control or authority over hazardous waste disposal."1
Thus, the imposition of CERCLA liability as an "operator" turned on
whether the person managed or controlled the activities of the facility
in question.52
In Idaho v. Bunker Hill Company,53 the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho further expanded the scope of CERCLA lia-
bility to include parent corporations which control and manage the
subsidiary's facility."4 Following the analysis of the courts in
NEPA CCO55 and in Carolawn,56 the Bunker Hill court identified con-
trol of hazardous waste disposal, releases, and management of the facil-
ity as the requisite factors for liability as an "operator."57 The court
interpreted section 107(a)(2)58 to impose liability upon those persons
who owned and operated the facilities at the time of the disposal of
hazardous substances.59 The court rejected the defendant's contention
that Congress intended to limit liability to only those "owners" and
49. Id. at 2131.
50. Id. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (outlining the NEPACCO district
court test).
51. 21 Env't. Rep. Cos. (BNA) 2124, 2131-32 (D.S.C. 1984). The court noted that
the statutory use of "who" and "his" rather than "which" or "its," in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) connotes individual personal involvement. Id.
See supra note 24 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
52. Id.
53. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
54. Id. at 671-72. In Bunker Hill, the court held a parent corporation liable as an
"operator" under CERCLA because it: (1) controlled a majority of the subsidiary's
board of directors; (2) had the authority to control hazardous waste disposal and re-
leases; (3) could make decisions and implement actions to prevent damage caused by
waste disposal; (4) received $27 million in dividends from the subsidiary between 1968
and 1974; (5) consolidated federal income tax returns with the subsidiary corporation,
Id. at 672.
55. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text for
a discussion of NEPACCO..
56. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). See supra notes 48-52 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Carolawn.
57. 635 F. Supp. at 665.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra note 60 for text of
statute.
59. 635 F. Supp. at 671.
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"operators" who had abandoned the facility.6° Rather, Congress in-
tended that all responsible parties pay decontamination costs.61 Thus,
the court employed the NEPA CCO test 62 to extend the definition of
"operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability to a parent corporation
which exhibited control and management over the subsidiary's
facility.6
3
In 1986, the District Court of South Carolina extended its Caro-
lawn 6' decision in United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Dispo-
sal, Inc.,65 by holding parties to a joint venture as common law
equivalents to "operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability.6 6 Conse-
quently, both parties were held vicariously liable for acts within the
scope of the venture, including decontamination costs.67 Thus, the
60. Id. The court noted that the plain language of § 107(a)(2) eliminates any possi-
bility that all past owners and operators are exempt from liability for hazardous waste
releases except those who abandoned their facilities. Id Section 107(a)(2) provides
"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of..." is liable. 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
61. 635 F. Supp. at 672 (citing United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124,
1127 (5th Cir. 1972)). See generally Rich, supra note 1, at 668.
62. 635 F. Supp. at 672 (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Company, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984)). See supra note 43 and accom-
panying text for NEPACCO text.
63. 635 F. Supp. at 672. The court cautious, however, that "care must be taken so
that 'normal' activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically
warrant finding the parent an owner or operator." Id.
64. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). See supra notes 48-52 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Carolawn.
65. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986).
66. Id. at 1004. The court defined joint venture as "a special combination of two or
more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any
actual partnership or corporate designation .... " Id. (citing Dexter and Carpenter v.
Houston, 20 F.2d 647, 651 (4th Cir. 1927)). The court determined that a joint venture
existed when "persons embark in an undertaking without entering on the prosecution of
the business as partners strictly, but engage in a common enterprise for their mutual
benefits." 653 F. Supp. at 1004 (citing Aiken Mills v. United States, 144 F.2d 23, 25
(4th Cir. 1944)). The court applied a test established by the Fourth Circuit in Rowe v.
Brooks, 329 F.2d 35, 40 (4th Cir. 1964), to determine the creation of a joint venture.
The test formulated by the Rowe court includes: (1) an oral agreement between the
parties to the venture, (2) the planned venture was for mutual advantage and profit, (3)
each party to the venture was to have a measure of control over and responsibility for
the enterprise, and (4) harm was caused by activities within the scope of the enterprise.
Id.
67. South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1004-05. The parties, McClure and
COCC, entered into a written agreement to reclaim and recycle chemical waste prod-
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court continued to expand the scope of CERCLA liability through the
application of the common law theory of joint venture.68
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co. presented the
Seventh Circuit with its first opportunity to examine the definition of
"operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability.69 The court held that
Osmose was not liable for decontamination costs to Hines as an
"owner" or "operator" under CERCLA.7° The unclear definition of
"operator" in CERCLA71 led the court to apply the common law theo-
ries of independent contractor and joint venture to determine liabil-
ity.72 The Hines court held that Osmose acted as an independent
construction contractor and thus should not be accountable for Hines'
liabilities.7" The court also found that the parties did not form a joint
venture.74 In applying these principles, the court reasoned that Os-
mose did not make operational decisions, control the facility on a daily
ucts. McClure procured the waste products and deposited them, while COCC provided
office space and secretarial service while retaining authority to veto McClure's actions.
The parties split the profits equally. Id. at 1000.
68. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the general application
of common law thqories to determine CERCLA liability).
69. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. Id. at 157-59. The court interpreted all facts and inferences in favor of Hines,
including the assumptions that Osmose negligently designed and built the facility, and
inadequately trained Hines' employees. The court noted that finding additional entities
liable would induce companies to take greater care in design, construction and instruc-
tion. Id. at 157.
The court, however, recqgnized its duty to enforce the statute and not create rules of
common law. Id. Accordingly, the court could impose CERCLA liability on Osmose
only if it was an "owner" or "operator" pursuant to § 107(a). Id. at 156.
71. Id. at 157. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of CER-
CLA's circular definition of "owner" and "operator."
72. 861 F.2d at 157. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the general application of common law theories to CERCLA liability.
73. 861 F.2d at 157-58. The Hines court explained that the employer of an in-
dependent contractor is not liable for the contractor's torts, nor is the contractor liable
for the employer's torts. Id. at 157. The court defined the common law independent
contractor as one who controls his own day-to-day operations. Id. at 157 (citing United
States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815-16 (1976)). In Hines, Osmose acted as the in-
dependent contractor when it designed and constructed the plant. Hines controlled and
managed the finished facility on a day-to-day basis, acting as the owner and the opera-
tor. 861 F.2d at 157-58.
74. 861 F.2d at 158. The court stated that the parties' relationship lacked three
requisite elements for the common law definition of joint venture: (1) willingness to
establish a joint venture, (2) shared control, and (3) participation in the division of
profits and losses. The Hines court emphasized that the contract between Osmose and
Hines specified that Osmose was not a joint venturer or partner with Hines. Further,
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basis, or share in the division of profits and losses." It further noted
that Congress did not intend to provide unlimited liability under CER-
CLA."6 Consequently, Osmose was not liable as an "operator" under
CERCLA.7
7
Unlike the Second 8 and Eighth 9 Circuits and the several United
States District Courts, 80 the Seventh Circuit defined limits for CER-
CLA liability.8 The court implicitly balanced the need to impose
cleanup costs82 on responsible parties against the social need for chemi-
cal and waste management industries. Moreover, it wisely interpreted
congressional intent by not construing CERCLA in the broadest sense
possible. The other courts8 3 which imposed CERCLA liability on "op-
erators" found the requisite elements of control and management that
are absent in Hines. Therefore, courts should adopt the principles set
forth in Hines and not extend CERCLA liability beyond its logical
limits.
The Hines decision exemplifies a judicial restriction of CERCLA lia-
bility to only those "owners" and "operators" who control or manage a
facility for the disposal of hazardous waste. Although an expansion of
Osmose neither managed nor controlled the Hines plant. Finally, the contract required
Hines alone to comply with environmental regulations. Id. at 158.
75. Id. at 158.
76. Id. at 157-59.
77. Id. at 157. Although courts could achieve "more" of CERCLA's legislative
purpose by finding additional parties responsible for the response costs, the Hines court
recognized that "statutes have not only ends but also limits... A court's job is to find
and enforce stopping points no less than to implement other legislative choices." Id.
Parties other than "owners" and "operators" must contribute only to the extent they
have agreed to do so by contract. Id. The court criticized Hines for not insisting on
warranties and indemnification from its suppliers in situations where Hines lacked ex-
pertise. Id. at 158-59.
78. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text discussing the Second Circuit
case, Shore Realty, regarding "operator" liability under CERCLA.
79. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text discussing the Eighth Circuit case,
NEPA4CCO, regarding "operator" liability under CERCLA.
80. See supra notes 5, 43-68 and accompanying text discussing federal district court
cases rgarding "operator" liability under CERCLA.
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion about the court's
reluctance to expand CERCLA liability to Osmose.
82. See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120 (CERCLA would enable the government to pursue
rapid recovery of costs incurred in financing response actions).
83. Contra Developments in the Law, supra note 28, at 1517 (explaining the impor-
tance of an expansive reading of the remedial provisions of CERCLA).
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CERCLA's potentially responsible parties would dilute the financial
burden for "owners" and "operators," it would provide a disincentive
for "owners" and "operators" to carry out the safety measures contem-
plated by CERCLA. Moreover, that decreased financial burden would
create an unnecessarily rigorous and punitive measure to the supplier
who provides the necessary chemicals and services to a facility in good
faith."4 Thus, neither Congress nor the courts should broaden the uni-
verse of potentially responsible parties under CERCLA.
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